"With little examination," Russell Hurlburt and Eric Schwitzgebel have observed, "introspection has re-entered psychology and philosophy. Even hard-nosed cognitive neuroscientists ask their subjects about their subjectively felt experience while in the fMRI magnet" (Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel 2007, 5).
founders of psychology who shared his belief in the fundamental role of introspection in psychology-as well as contemporary psychologists, philosophers, and neuroscientists who have invited introspection back into their respective fields-all share a certain basic philosophical supposition (tacitly held, perhaps). The supposition is that introspection is a possible act to perform.
Comte's Denial of Introspection
Auguste Comte famously denied this supposition. According to him, the very notion of introspection, of interior observation ("l'observation interieure"), is a "fundamental sophism" and "pure illusion" (Comte 1988, 20) . It amounts to the "the supposition of a man seeing himself think"-a clear "absurdity" (Comte 1855, 383). Comte's denial of introspection was formulated when scientific psychology was in its infancy, exercising a clear influence upon both its formative and subsequent development (Hatfield 2005,271-72) .
We will consider some of Comte's objections to introspection in this paper. 3 The aim will be to take the Comtean criticism of introspection as the point of embarkation for an exploration of some general philosophical considerations regarding introspective self-observation. This paper is not intended as a contribution to systematic and scholarly Comte history, nor as an excursion into critical exegesis. No general assessment or evaluation of Comte's overall philosophy will be put forward. We will consider only Comte's arguments against introspection, as these are made in his Course on Positive Philosophy4_a work otherwise dominated by the ambitions of furnishing a comprehensive, systematic, and constructive methodological project (Gane 2006,2-6) . Only Comte's famous objections to introspection, as these have been generally received, will be our concern.
We begin by making a few prefatory remarks about Comte and his times. Born on January 19 in 1798, in Montpellier near the Southern coast of France, Comte came to the world as the French Revolution was ending, he was a young child when Napoleon Bonaparte declared himself emperor, and he was a teenager when the Battle of Waterloo was fought. In this atmosphere of social havoc and unrestrained radical thought, he developed a system of philosophy-positivism-envisioned as a comprehensive, secularized religion of science and humanity.
